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Abstract
This note describes the e¤ects on human capital formation of rank-order tournaments o¤ering
identical prizes to a given share of the ranked contestants. This compensation scheme is thought
to resemble the selection processes in di¤erent areas of the public administration, particularly in
Southern European countries. In the presence of contestants with identical ability, the incentives
for educational e¤ort are highest when the variance of nal returns is maximized.
1 Introduction
The labor market consequences of human capital formation have very often raised concerns about
the e¢ ciency and equity in the design of education systems. Is there really a trade o¤ between both
desirable objectives? At which stages of individual upbringing are e¢ ciency and equity comple-
mentary or conictive? Woessmann (2006) advanced some features for a European-wide assessment
about this question. He emphasized that during the early childhood there is room for planning
to make progress simultaneously in both directions. On the contrary, adulthood o¤ers much more
limited opportunities for the acquisition of basic skills. Therefore, in the older ages most of the e¢ -
ciency gains come from the personal e¤ort and the interaction of procient individuals, who invested
abundantly before (see e.g. Carneiro and Heckman (2003)).
Here we will focus on the educational role of the selection processes for state employees. We will
emphasize how, in the presence of a huge number of candidates for each position, many peoples cog-
nitive faculties are likely to be underemployed due to their discouraged, merely tentative preparation
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for tournaments. On the other extreme, there is another risk of low educational e¤ort when jobs are
too easy to achieve. This fact implies that there is some room for public optimization in terms of the
employability after job competition; which may have an impact on the e¢ cient allocation of physical
and human resources in the administration. Moreover, since the degree of employability obviously
a¤ects the nal income distribution, such optimization will also have a bearing on the equity of the
resulting allocations.
In this paper we will present two models to illustrate such possibilities of optimization in terms
of employability. The rst one is inspired by Lazear and Rosen (1981)s work on rank-order tour-
naments for homogeneous contenders in terms of ability. It turns out that our setting o¤ers a neat
employability criterion in terms of the variance of returns after the tournament. Finally, we extend
the analysis to a model with heterogeneous participants, which o¤ers a more precise intuition for
the existing trade-o¤s.
2 Theory
2.1 A rank-order tournament with homogeneous contestants
In this setting the payment di¤erences depend on rank orders instead of performance distances.
The prizes are set in advance and are independent of the output (grade) generated ex-post. More
specically, such prizes are identical and o¤ered to a given fraction of the ranked contestants. The
model consists of a single period, and therefore the prizes should be understood in terms of lifetime
productivity and career development (in the public service). The student-workers participating in
the tournament are risk neutral, and their grade depends on their educational e¤ort (e) and an
idiosyncratic shock realization. Such randomness enters in an additive form, and the grade of any
contestant j = 1; :::; n (gj) is equal to
gj = ej + "j
where "j stands for the idiosyncratic shock realization, uniformly distributed in [0; a], a > 0. As
a result, the grade observed by the employer is uniformly distributed in [ej   a; ej + a]. Since the
participants are homogeneous, here all choose the same education level E. Let an individual choose
level e, while all others choose E; let e > E.
This individual wins against a single other individual with a certain probability p (e;E) (see
diagram below).
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How can we obtain the exact value of p (e;E)?. First of all, for grades within the interval
[E + a; e+ a] any score of our individual will beat his rival for sure. Moreover, for grades between
e   a and E + a, any grade x of our individual wins against the rival with probability x (E a)2a .
Therefore,
p  p (e;E) = e  E
2a
+
1
2a
Z E+a
e a
x  (E   a)
2a
dx =
e  E
2a
+
1
8a2
h
(x  (E   a))2
iE+a
e a
=
=
1
2
+
e  E
2a
  (e  E)
2
8a2
(1)
Then, the derivative of p (e;E) with respect to e is
p0  p0e (e;E) =
1
2a
  (e  E)
4a2
(2)
and if we consider a situation of symmetry where e = E, from (1) and (2) we can observe that
p(E;E) =
1
2
; p0e(E;E) =
1
2a
(3)
Now, as we anticipated above, we assume a population of contenders of size n. Let us also assume
that there are h jobs. The purpose of the public employer is thus nding the right value of h
(h) such that the aggregate human capital of the population is maximized. To be selected, every
competitor has to be in the top h, i.e. either he defeated all (n  1); or he defeated exactly (n  2)
and was defeated by one; or he defeated exactly (n  3) and two defeated him;...or he defeated
exactly (n  h) and (h  1) defeated him. The probability of being in the top h is therefore:
h 1X
s=0

n  1
s

pn 1 s (1  p)s (4)
Using equation (4), the expected utility of our participant with education e when all others choose
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E is
w
"
h 1X
s=0

n  1
s

pn 1 s (1  p)s
#
  c (e) (5)
The derivative of (5) with respect to e taken at the point e = E should be zero in a symmetric
Bayesian equilibrium. Otherwise, when all choose E a single individual would choose a di¤erent
education level.
wp0
h 1X
s=0
(n  1  s)

n  1
s

pn 2 s (1  p)s   wp0
h 1X
s=0
s

n  1
s

pn 1 s (1  p)s 1 = c0e (e) (6)
Substituting in (6) the values of p and p0at e = E according to (3),
h 1X
s=0
(n  1  2s)

n  1
s

=
2n 1a
w
c0e(E) (7)
The left hand side rst increases with h, but as (h  1) becomes larger than n 12 it ends up decreasing
with h, as more negative terms are added. This means that E rst increases with the number of
jobs and then starts falling, but that happens when the number of jobs is roughly one half of the
population. It is straightforward to check that a compensation scheme such that h = h ' n2 also
maximizes the variance of the participantsreturns ex-post. Furthermore, the resulting optimal Gini
coe¢ cient is exactly equal to 50.
Mejia and Saint Pierre (2009)s general equilibrium model yields a similar result for a decen-
tralized market allocation of workers to jobs: an intermediate value of the prize inequality induces
the highest accumulation of human capital. However, such result is not analytical: it comes from a
numerical calibration and simulation of their model.
2.2 Benchmarking with heterogeneous participants
Another usual practice in the selection of personnel is setting a benchmark (b) and awarding a job to
all candidates with a grade above. In this case there is no strategic behavior, since each candidates
chances to pass do not depend on the performance of others. We include this alternative setting
because it will be useful to understand the intuitive reasons why the prole of aggregate education
could slope downwards (for very low values of b). The basic intuition present in the following
subsections was already advanced by Asali et al. (2014).
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2.2.1 Overview
Our candidates for the positions learn for their entry examinations. When they get a job their
remuneration is w. Their choice of education level e will provide them, when tested, with a random
grade uniformly distributed in [e  1; e+ 1]. There are various types of candidates, characterized by
their costs of learning each education level. In particular, for type  it costs c (e; ) to learn the level
e. We assume that c (e; ) increases with e but decreases with : for the highest types it costs less
to learn.
Now the employer sets a benchmark b, such that all those who achieve a grade higher than b will
get a job. Finally, there will be a precise correspondence between the benchmark and the number
of positions available (the former will determine the latter).
According to their chances to succeed, the candidates are divided into 3 groups:
- Those whose preferred level of education e is high: e > b + 1, so that they will obtain a job
with probability 1. Since lower education levels cost less, they will reduce their education level to
the lowest for which they will be accepted for sure, i.e. e = b+ 1.
- Those whose preferred level of education provides them with a position with a positive proba-
bility less than 1. For these individuals b  1 < e < b+ 1. When studying level e, their probability
for being selected is e+1 b2 .
- Those who will not study for the examination and will never get a job, since for these individuals
e < b  1.
How do the candidates choose their level of education? If type  chooses a level of education e
such that b  1  e  b+ 1, his probability of getting a job is e+1 b2 and his expected payo¤:
w
e+ 1  b
2
  c (e; ) (8)
This is maximized when
w
2
= c0e (e; ) (9)
In order to have a maximum we assume convexity of c (:; :). Furthermore, given a level of education
e we can nd the type  =  (e) that solves the above equation. Our assumptions imply that the
type  (e) increases with e.
When the employer lowers the benchmark b, there are 4 basic e¤ects: those aspirants with a
preferred e¤ort above the old (b+ 1) will lower their education level. Others used to work with an
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e¤ort given by the condition (9), but now will lower their education level to the new (b+ 1). Some
of those below the old (b+ 1) - who were previously accepted with a certain probability - will keep
their e¤ort level but improve their chances to get a job. Additionally, some new candidates, who so
far did not study, will enter the competition by acquiring some education.
Whether the overall level of education has increased or decreased depends on the changes in the
education levels and the number of competitors changing their levels. For instance, it is clear that
when the benchmark is very low, the number of competitors with preferred education level above
b is high, and they will all lower their e¤ort when b falls. This will probably cause a net negative
e¤ect on the aggregate education level, which is likely to happen when the initial benchmark is
low, when the number of jobs is large. On the other hand, when the benchmark is high, there are
few individuals above the benchmark. They will lower their education when the benchmark falls,
but their e¤ect will be small (due to their small numbers) compared to those who newly joined the
competition, hence the total e¤ect is likely to be an increase in education.
We propose two measures of the aggregate education level of the population. The rst measure
is the total education induced by the competition (henceforth TE). This considers the education of
all those who studied, including those who did not get a position because their grade was low. To
simplify, we take the level they studied to, not their grade. The second measure is the education
level of the employed (henceforth TEW ). This includes only those whose grade was above the
benchmark. We take the average of the population assuming that the unemployed have level zero.
Now we will present a discrete, illustrative example. Let us note that we could also present a
general example with a continuum of types, which would convey the same basic intuition.
2.2.2 A discrete example with 2 types
Let there be two types in the existing population of aspirants: 1 > 2. Let us also denote by
ei  (c0e) 1
 
w
2 ; i

the optimal level of education for type i resulting from the rst order condition
(9). There is a measure fi of type i, with f1 + f2 = 1.
First of all, let us dene 4  e1   e2 > 0. A higher value of 4, the distance between both
preferred e¤orts, means that either the heterogeneity is very strong and/or the skill premium is very
high. In that case, the optimal e¤ort by the best type will be much higher than the e¤ort level of
the worst type. The employer will hire a larger sta¤ the lower is the benchmark b in place. We
know that, for the benchmark to be really selective, necessarily b > e2   1; and for the benchmark
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to be accessible to some candidates, necessarily b < e1+1. We will divide now the range of possible
values of b into 3 intervals/regions, starting from the highest values of b and gradually lowering the
benchmark:
- Region a): e1 + 1 > b  e2 + 1. This is the interval with highest possible values of the
benchmark and lowest admission chances for the aspirants. Since only the top-type individuals will
have some chances to be hired, though only a share of them will succeed, we can conclude that here
TE(b) = e1f1 and TEW (b) = e

1f1
e1+1 b
2 .
- Region b): e1   1  b  e2 + 1. This region will exist only if 4 < 2. Otherwise we should
only consider the regions a) and c). Within this interval, aspirants of both types will be able to
succeed or fail. This means that the prole of TE(b) will be at and will show the highest possible
value for the aggregate educational e¤ort. That is, TE(b) = e1f1 + e

2 (1  f1) and TEW (b) =
e1f1
e1+1 b
2 + e

2 (1  f1) e

2+1 b
2 .
- Region c): e1   1  b  e2   1. Along this interval, the top-type individuals will start
to relax once their success is guaranteed. Therefore, here TE(b) = (b + 1)f1 + (1   f1)e2 and
TEW (b) = (b + 1)f1 + (1   f1)e2 1+e

2 b
2 . It is clear that TE(b) in this interval is also at, but
exhibiting a lower level of aggregate education than in Region b), since the top-types are studying
just for the passing grade. By di¤erentiating TEW (b) with respect to b within this region, we can
derive that
dTEW (b)
db
= f1   (1  f1)e

2
2
> (<) 0 i¤ f1 > (<)
e2
2 + e2
That is, as we continue lowering b and increasing the admission probabilities, the aggregate stock of
employed human capital may decrease if there are many top-type individuals who reduce their e¤ort
and the newcomers are su¢ ciently "awkward". This claries that considerably high job opportunities
result in a lower aggregate schooling; and sometimes (if the most talented are many, and su¢ ciently
better than the least talented) the aggregate schooling of the labor force could even fall. That is,
lots of good jobs reduce the aggregate stock of human capital employed by the economy, since the
employability of the worst types often involves some relaxation on the part of the best types.
3 Conclusions
This paper presents a framework for the evaluation of di¤erent levels of employability in the public
administration. The criterion is their contribution to the formation of human capital: a crucial
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variable for the long run prospects of accumulation and growth. The suitability of this objective
has been defended by authors like Docquier and Rapoport (2012). We hope this might be useful to
build di¤erent quantitative applications in the future, aiming to an assessment of the administrative
reforms in any particular economy. Another interesting extension may be studying the implications
of the business cycle volatility on employability and, subsequently, on the educational e¤ort of Ph.D.
students, research fellows, etc.
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